Extensive research in the behavioural sciences has addressed people's ability to learn 26 probabilities of stochastic events, typically assuming them to be stationary (i.e., constant over 27 time). Only recently have there been attempts to model the cognitive processes whereby people 28 learnand tracknon-stationary probabilities, reviving the old debate on whether learning 29 occurs trial-by-trial or by occasional shifts between discrete hypotheses. Trial-by-trial updating 30 modelssuch as the delta-rule modelhave been popular in describing human learning in 31 various contexts, but it has been argued that they are inadequate for explaining how humans 32 update beliefs about non-stationary probabilities. Specifically, it has been claimed that these 33 models cannot account for the discrete, stepwise updating that characterises response patterns 34 in experiments where participants tracked a non-stationary probability based on observed 35 outcomes. Here, we demonstrate that the rejection of trial-by-trial models was premature for 36 two reasons. First, our experimental data suggest that the stepwise behaviour depends on details 37 of the experimental paradigm. Hence, discreteness in response data does not necessarily imply 38 discreteness in internal belief updating. Second, previous studies have dismissed trial-by-trial 39 models mainly based on qualitative arguments rather than quantitative model comparison. To 40 evaluate the models more rigorously, we performed a likelihood-based model comparison 41 between stepwise and trial-by-trial updating models. Across eight datasets collected in three 42 different labs, human behaviour is consistently best described by trial-by-trial updating models. 43
Memory-based models, on the other hand, rely on the memory of previously observed 125 outcomes. They encode and then retrieve memories of events, often in the form of recency-126 constrained samples, to calculate beliefs on-line. These models have been applied to a variety 127 Ricci and Gallistel (2017) . All text translated from Swedish to English and slightly enlarged for readability. (B) Example of response data (black) in an experiment where the hidden Bernoulli probability (red) was changing in a stepwise fashion (Participant 1 in Gallistel et al., 2014) . (Ashby & Valentin, 2017; Bruner 139 et al., 1956) , and function learning (Brehmer, 1974 (Brehmer, , 1980 . Because a single data point typically 140
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provides little evidence about a hypothesis, these models predict that the beliefs may sometimes 141 stay unchanged over many trials. 142
According to current theory, trial-by-trial models are unable to account for the stepwise 143 patterns found in experiments where participants track non-stationary probabilities (Gallistel et 144 al., 2014; Ricci & Gallistel, 2017 ) ( Figure 1B ). Instead, it has been proposed that the stepwise 145 response pattern is caused by discreteness in how the participants update their beliefs, which 146 Gallistel et al. (2014) formalised in a hypothesis-testing model that they named the "If it ain't 147 broke, don't fix it" (IIAB) model. According to this model, participants assess whether their 148 current belief is "broke" after each new observation and only update their belief if the answer 149 is in the affirmative. The suggestion is that humans do not estimate probabilities directly: they 150 estimate changes in the hidden Bernoulli parameter and infer probabilities from this. 151 152
Purpose of this study 153
In the present work, we address three potential weaknesses in previous studies. The first 154 one is related to the available data. Four previous studies (Gallistel et al., 2014; Khaw et al., 155 2017; Ricci & Gallistel, 2017; Robinson, 1964) have reported stepwise response updating in 156 probability learning experiments with non-stationary probabilities. In three of those 157 experiments (Gallistel et al., 2014; Khaw et al., 2017; Robinson, 1964) , the underlying 158 probability changed discretely. As noted by Ricci and Gallistel (2017) , this is problematic, 159 because it could mean that the discreteness in response patterns simply reflects the discreteness 160 in the true underlying function, rather than discreteness in belief updating. Therefore, 161 7 competing models of probability learning should primarily be tested using data from 162 experiments in which the Bernoulli parameter changes in a continuous fashion. To the best of 163 our knowledge, the study by Ricci and Gallistel (2017) is the only one so far that has performed 164 such an experiment. However, for three 1 of their nine participants, the Bernoulli processes 165 consisted of long periods of no change followed by a quite abrupt change, thus closely 166 resembling a discretely changing parameter. Altogether, this means that current theories about 167 human learning of non-stationary probabilities rely heavily on data from only six participants. 168
The first purpose of the present study is to study the robustness of previous findings by using a 169 larger participant sample. 170
A second potential weakness of previous studies is that the experimental design may 171 unintentionally have invited stepwise behaviour. In all previous studies, participants were 172 informed that the distribution they were inferring would change over the course of the 173 experiment. If participants had reason to believe that the changes in the probability that they 174 were tracking were discrete (e.g., because they were told that the box would be replaced "from 175 time to time"), then this may have invited stepwise response behaviour. In addition to this, the 176 bodily effort required to change one's estimate was in all previous studies substantially greater 177 than that needed to maintain it. Robinson (1964) had the participants adjust a lever while 178 Gallistel et al. (2014) , Ricci and Gallistel (2017) and Khaw et al. (2017) required them to move 179 the computer mouse, adjust a slider and move the mouse back again before clicking "Next". In 180 contrast, maintaining one's previous guess merely required pressing the left mouse button once 181 (Gallistel et al., 2014; Khaw et al., 2017; Ricci & Gallistel, 2017) or no action at all (Robinson, 182 1964) . The asymmetry between the effort required to maintain or change the estimate may have 183 affected the rate of re-estimations, especially when considering that participants performed 184 10,000 trials. 2 In Gallistel et al. (2014) and Ricci and Gallistel (2017) a further asymmetry 185 existed in that a participant could move the slider by clicking right or left of its current position, 186 which would make it jump a set distance. This made it easier to move it in large steps than in 187 small ones. The second purpose of our study is to examine whether experimental design choices 188 regarding instructions and response mode affect the degree of discreteness in response patterns. Conditions. The experiment followed a two-by-two factorial design, with "Response 244
Mode" and "Instruction Mode" as the independent variables (see Table 1 ). The first variable 245 had two levels: "Low Effort" and "High Effort". In the High Effort response mode, participants 246 revised their estimate by first clicking on the slider and then dragging it to adjust its value. 247
When they were finished, they would click a "next" button to the right of the slider to initiate 248 the next trial. In the Low Effort response mode of our experiment, no cursor or "next" button 249 was visible, and the slider value would change whenever the mouse was moved. Participants 250 initiated the next trial by a mouse click. The second independent variable also had two levels. 251 10 In the "Informed" Instruction Mode, participants were explicitly informed about the non-252 stationarity of the generative process: they were told that the contents of the box might change 253 after each draw and that these changes would occur throughout the task. They were also told 254 that the changes could be fast or slow and that their task was to track the proportion as it 255 changed. Participants in the "Uninformed" Instruction Mode were not provided with this 256 information. In all four conditions, the hidden Bernoulli parameter was a sinusoidal with a 257 minimum of 0, a maximum of 1, and a period of 500. Its value at the very first trial was 0.50. 258
Condition 2 is almost identical to the design described in Ricci and Gallistel (2017) . To the best 259 of our knowledge, the only difference is that in the original study, the slider would jump a set 260 distance when the participant clicked to the left or right of it. 4 
261
Procedure. At the start of the experiment, participants read a paper detailing that they 262 were allowed to discontinue their participation at any stage; that the experiment would be 263 divided into two sessions with a break in between; that the average difference between each of 264 their guesses and the correct answer would determine their reward; and what the highest 265 possible reward was. Meanwhile, a Swedish translation of the instructions found in Appendix 266 A in Gallistel et al. (2014) was displayed on the screen, but without the passages relating to 267 reporting that the box had changed. In the Low effort conditions, the relevant parts of the 268 instructions were altered to explain how to answer using the Low Effort response mechanism. 269
In the Informed conditions, paragraphs were added to explain that the box could be swapped 270 every time a ring was put back into it, that these changes could be large or small, and that their 271 task was to estimate the proportion of blue rings in the box and track it as it changed throughout 272 the task (see the online materials at https://osf.io/zhv2r/ for English translations of the 273 instructions). Participants were not told anything about how often they were supposed to make 274 a change to the slider. 275
When the participant indicated that they had read everything, the experimenter would 276 approach them to ask if they had understood all that they had read and if they had any further 277 questions. If asked a question regarding anything not revealed in the instructions, the 278 experimenter would respond that he was unable to provide that information. Any question 279 pertaining to practicalities of how to carry out the task would be clarified upon request. The 280 participants then completed 1,000 trials before a pause screen was displayed, inviting them to 281 take a break. At their leisure, participants were allowed to commence the second session of 282 1,000 trials. The length of the break varied strongly across participants, ranging from 12 283 seconds to 17 minutes, with a mean of 3 minutes and 6 seconds. 284
After finishing the experiment, the participants filled out post-test questionnaires with 285 questions concerning their beliefs about the generative function, self-assessed statistics 286 proficiency, age, gender and education. Finally, they were asked to draw the probability of 287 drawing a blue ring as a function of trial count into a graph. The questionnaires were 288 administered on paper and filled in with pen. However, we found little use for the questionnaire 289 data and did not analyse them. 5 
290
Analysis. All statistical analyses are performed using the JASP software package with 291 default settings (JASP Team, 2019) and R (R Core Team, 2014). 292 293
Results 294
Accuracy. A visual inspection of the mean estimations ( Figure 2A) shows that, on 295 average, the participants tracked the wave-like pattern of the underlying probability reasonably 296 well in all four conditions of the experiment. However, average accuracy is clearly highest in 297 the condition where the participants were informed about the non-stationary generative function 298 and making changes to the slider involved more effort ( Figure 2B ). We next perform statistical 299 tests to determine if there is evidence for effects of Information Mode and Effort Mode on the 300 root mean squared error (RMSE) between the generating probability and the participant's 301
estimate. 302
Since the data violate the normality assumption of standard ANOVA analyses 303 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p<10 −13 ), we apply a Kruskal-Wallis and a Friedman test, with the 304 two between-participant conditions as fixed factors and repeated measurement across blocks of 305 500 trials each. An initial main effects analysis suggests a main effect of Information Mode 306 (H(1) = 8.919, p = 0.003) but not of Effort Mode (H(1) = 0.685, p = 0.408) or Block of Trials 307 (χ 2 (3) = 1.043, p = .791). However, Dunn's post hoc test between the four between-participant 308 cells indicates that this main effect is secondary to the interaction between Information Mode 309 and Effort Mode presented in Figure 2C , with significantly lower median RMSE 310 (approximately 0.13) in the Informed, High Effort condition than in the other three conditions 311 (median RMSE > 0.30; pholm < .020; see Appendix A for details on the Dunn's post hoc test). 312
To get an indication of how well participants performed in an absolute sense, we compare 313 their accuracy to that of fictive observers who always responds 0.50 ( Figure 2C , dashed lines) 314 12 or randomly ( Figure 2C , dotted lines). It is clear that despite that the average estimates track 315 the functions in all conditions in Figure 2A , in three of the conditions the trial-by-trial accuracy 316 in terms of RMSE is no better than what is expected from a participant who always responds 317 with the probability 0.50. In sum: participants did not improve with training and although the 318 average estimates tracked the underlying function, the trial-by-trial accuracy was poor in all 319 conditions, except when the participants were informed about the nonstationary process and 320 used the more effortful response method. 321 Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence as an alternative measure of accuracy. We perform the same 326 analyses with the KL divergence as the dependent variable and find an initial main effect of 327 Information Mode (H(1) = 8.656, p = 0.003) but not of Effort Mode (H(1) = 0.367, p = 0.544) 328 or Block of Trials (χ 2 (3) = 2.187, p = 0.534). Dunn's post hoc test shows that it is secondary to 329 the interaction between Information Mode and Effort Mode ( Figure 2C ). The median KL 330 divergence in the informed high effort condition (approximately 0.064) is significantly lower 331 than in the other three conditions (median KL divergence > 0.267; pholm ≤ .030; see Appendix 332
A for details on the Dunn's post hoc test). Hence, the results are consistent between the RMSE 333 and KL divergence. 334
Step width. We next examine whether the experimental manipulations affect the average 335 number of trials between slider updates, in previous studies referred to as "step width" (Gallistel 336 et al., 2014; Ricci & Gallistel, 2017) . The initial main effects analyses, with the same non-337 parametric tests as we applied to the RMSE, suggest significant main effects of Information 338
Mode (H(1) = 9.46, p = 0.002), Effort Mode (H(1) = 15.12, p < 0.001) and Block of Trials 339 (χ 2 (3) = 69.33, p < 0.001). The main effect of Block of Trials is an increasing step width, and 340 thus decreasing rate of re-estimation, with additional training. The main effects of Information 341
Mode and Effort Mode are qualified by the interaction illustrated in Figure 2C . Dunn's post 342 hoc test shows that the median step width is significantly higher in the condition with no 343 information about the non-stationarity of the process and a High Effort response mode 344 (approximately 39) as compared to the other three conditions (medians between approximately 345 2 and 9: pholm < 0.020, see Appendix A for details on Dunn's post hoc test). In sum: with more 346 training the step width increased somewhat, and it was much larger in the condition without 347 information about nonstationary and a high-effort response mode. In other words, when the 348 participants were uninformed that the probability would change over time and the response 349 required more effort, they were more reluctant to change their estimate. 350
Step height. Finally, we test if Information Mode and Effort Mode affected the average 351 magnitude of the slider adjustments on trials when the estimate was updated, referred to as the 352 "step height" in Gallistel et al. (2014) and Ricci and Gallistel (2017) . Applying the same 353 statistical tests as above, the results suggest main effects of Information Mode (H(1) = 14.633, 354 p < 0.001) and Effort Mode (H(1) = 11.363, p < 0.001), but not of Block of Trials (χ 2 (3) = 355 6.766, p = 0.080). Dunn's post hoc test supports both a main effect of Information Mode and 356 an interaction between Information Mode and Effort Mode, as illustrated in Figure 2C . The 357 median step height was significantly greater with information about the non-stationarity than 358 14 without, both with the Low Effort response mode (medians 0.0312 vs. 0.0177; pholm = 0.043) 359 and the High Effort response mode (medians .107 vs. 0.0445; pholm = 0.003), suggesting a main 360 effect of information regardless of the amount of effort required to update the response. In 361 addition, the Informed, High Effort condition had a higher median than all of the other three 362 conditions, suggesting a (catalytic) interaction for this specific condition (see Appendix A for 363 the full results of Dunn's post hoc test). In sum, Block of Trials had no effect on the step height, 364 but information about non-stationarity of the process increased it, especially when the high-365 effort response mode was used. Thus, when the participants were told that the underlying 366 probability could change over time, the changes they made were larger, and this was especially 367 the case if the response mode required more effort. 368 369 Discussion 370
Although the average estimates track the sinusoid function in all conditions (Figure 2A ), 371 in absolute terms the trial-by-trial accuracy was poor in three of the four conditions, in the sense 372 that the deviation from the true probability on a given trial was no smaller than expected from 373 a participant who responds with 0.50 on each trial (median RMSE approximately 0.35, see 374 Figure 2C ). In part, of course, this reflects the relative complexity of the task the participants 375 are faced with. It takes at least a few observations to get a reliable estimate of the underlying 376 probability. When this probability changes on each trialas in our experimentthe observer's 377 estimate will always lag behind the generating value. Optimal performance would require 378 participants to infer the abstract function that relates the trial number to the true probability and 379 to use this function to predict the true probability on the next trial. To induce this function from 380 the "foggy" output of a constantly changing Bernoulli distribution is difficult, especially so if 381 the observer is provided with only minimum information about the generative process. For this 382 reason, some previous studies have assessed participant performance by comparing their 383 responses to those of an optimal observer rather than to the true generating value (Gallistel et investigating the degree of optimality of participants. However, here we are primarily interested 386 in the relative performance between groups, for which any measure of accuracy seems suitable. 387
The high accuracy and distinctly stepwise re-estimation behaviour observed in Ricci and 388 Gallistel (2017) and the other previous studies were only replicated when the participants were 389 informed about the non-stationarity of the process beforehand and used the more effortful 390 response mode, which are the conditions under which it has previously been observed. Better 391 performance with more accurate prior information about the task is obviously no surprise. But 392 15 this effect interacted with the effort required by the response mode in an interesting way. With 393 a low effort response mode, there are frequent but small adjustments (median step width of 394 approximately 5, suggesting about 100 re-estimations per block of 500 trials, of a median size 395 of .03), and this holds regardless of whether participants are informed about non-stationarity or 396 not. With the High Effort response mode, the pattern with relatively rare, large re-estimations 397 only occurred with prior information that the process is non-stationary. The behavioural 398 differences are indeed large. Participants without information about the non-stationarity and 399 with the more effortful response mode rarely re-estimate and make rather small adjustments 400 when they do (median step width of 39 trials, suggesting approximately 13 re-estimations per 401 block of 500 trials, with a median size of .04). The participants with information about the non-402 stationarity and with the more effortful response mode often change their estimates (median 403 step width of 9 trials suggesting approximately 56 re-estimations per block of 500 trials) and 404 usually by quite a lot (median step height of .11) The characteristic stepwise patterns of the 405 predictions of the IIAB-model (Gallistel et al., 2014) were thus observed in only one cell and 406 appear to arise under specific conditions, suggesting that rare but large re-estimations are not 407 necessarily intrinsic to the cognitive process. 408
An alternative explanation of the effects of the independent variables on step width and 409 step height is that they merely reflect the fact that the Low Effort response mode results in an 410 increase in the number of small, accidental adjustments. When the slider is "stuck" to the mouse 411 cursor, participants might occasionally produce unintended adjustments. When the slider has to 412 be dragged, this is less likely to occur. This kind of "shaky hand" error would decrease both the 413 average step width and step height. There are relatively small negative main effects of having 414 a low effort response mode on both of those dependent variables. Since we cannot rule out that 415 the shaky hand effect exists, these should be interpreted with some caution. However, the 416 substantial interaction between High Effort and Information Mode is not possible to attribute 417 to such error. If unintentional adjustments as a result of the low effort response mechanism is a 418 pervasive phenomenon, it should affect the results equally regardless of what information is 419 provided. We would therefore argue that the main result of our experimentthat the previously 420 observed stepwise updating arises as a result of particular combinations of circumstances -421 holds regardless of whether the Low Effort response mode increases the number of accidental 422
adjustments. 423
A tentative interpretation of the results is that people spontaneously tend to be "myopic", 424 only considering small samples of the most recent observations, which they project onto the 425 next trial as an estimate of the probability. This estimate can, in principle, change from trial to 426 16 trial, as is consistent with the small and frequent adjustments produced by the participants in 427 several conditions, and their overt expression of the estimate is affected by the effort required 428 to produce the response, as is consistent with the significant effects of Response Mode. 429 Intriguingly, the effortful response mode seems to have invited participants to consider larger 430 sample sizes, allowing them to better track changes in the underlying probability. 431
To conclude, a key implication of these results is that the discreteness of the response 432 data seems sensitive to external factors, which calls into question whether it should be thought 433 of as inherent to human probability inference as has been done in previous literature. Instead, 434 the pattern may reflect adaptations to the particulars of the task at hand. In other words, it is 435 possible that the internal belief updating is continuous and only the slider adjustments occur 436 discretely. 437
438

MODELLING 439
According to the currently leading theory, human behaviour in probability estimation 440 tasks is consistent with hypothesis-testing models and cannot be explained by any trial-by-trial 441 updating model (Gallistel et al., 2014; Ricci & Gallistel, 2017) . Above, we presented 442 experimental evidence that calls the first part of this claim into question; the remainder of this 443 paper is dedicated to evaluating the plausibility of the second part, by using formal model 444 comparison techniques. Our approach makes four important methodological improvements on 445 previous studies. First, instead of setting parameters manually, we use maximum-likelihood 446 fitting to determine parameter values. Second, instead of fitting models to summary statistics, 447
we fit them to the raw data. This way, we use all available information and avoid having to 448 decide which statistics to look at and how to weight them against each other. Third, instead of 449 evaluating goodness of fit through visual inspection of plots, we use formal model comparison 450 techniques. Fourth, instead of evaluating the models only against our own data, we also include 451 all available data from other studies in our analyses. 452 453
Factorial model design 454
When models differ from each other in multiple ways, it is hard to identify which factor 455 explains the success of one model over another. To circumvent such identifiability problems, 456
we apply a method known as factorial model comparison (van den Berg, Awh, & Ma, 2014). 457
Just as in factorial experimental designs and factorial ANOVAs, this means that we pair every 458 choice in one factor with every possible choice in the other factors. The goal is not only to 459 identify the model that best captures the underlying process, but also to quantify evidence for 460 each factor level, much as an ANOVA quantifies the evidence for each of the main effects. We 461 deconstruct the models that we consider here into two factors: the updating mechanism and the 462 threshold mechanism. For convenience, Table 2 provides an overview of the most important 463 mathematical terms and symbols appearing in the model specifications. Factor 1: Updating mechanism. This factor determines how and when the observer 469 updates their belief about the hidden Bernoulli probability, ptrue. We consider three options: the 470 IIAB mechanism, a delta-rule mechanism, and a memory-based averaging mechanism. The 471 essence of the IIAB mechanism (Gallistel et al., 2014) is that it maintains a list of "change 472 points" that is updated through hypothesis testing. The change points summarise at which 473 earlier time points there was, according to the model, a change in ptrue and how large each 474 18 supposed change was. After making a new observation, the mechanism tests the hypothesis that 475 "something is broke". It does so by computing how much the currently held belief about ptrue -476 as encoded in the most recently registered change pointdeviates from the estimate based on 477 all observations since the last change point. When this discrepancy exceeds a threshold T1, it is 478 concluded that "something is broke" and that it "needs fixing." The updating mechanism then 479 proceeds to a second stage, where three further hypotheses are tested about what might be 480 wrong: the last registered change point was incorrect and must be expunged, it was at the wrong 481 point and should be moved, or there has been a new change point after the last one encoded, 482 which now needs to be registered. Once a decision has been made on this, the mechanism 483 updates the list of change points accordingly and adjusts the slider value, pslider, to make it 484 consistent with what is now the latest estimated change point. For a detailed description of the 485 mechanism, see Gallistel et al. (2014) . Importantly, since it can take many observations before 486 it is detected that "something is broke", slider updates in this type of model tend to happen in a 487 discrete fashion. 488
The second updating mechanism that we consider is the delta rule, which we abbreviate 489 as "Delta". Unlike the IIAB mechanism, the delta rule has no notion of hypothesis testing and, 490 therefore, has no threshold on its belief updating. Instead, it updates its estimate of the hidden 491 
where parameter λ is the learning rate. Another difference to the IIAB mechanism is that since 495 an update is made on each trial, the magnitude of the updates will often be very small. However, 496 considering that it is effortful in both time and energy to adjust the slider value, it seems 497 reasonable to assume that observers only do so when the discrepancy between slider and belief 498 has grown sufficiently large. Therefore, we impose a response threshold T1 on this discrepancy, 499 such that a slider update is only made when it is considered to be worth the effort. 500
The third and final updating mechanism that we consider is a memory-based weighted 501 average, which we abbreviate as "M-Avg". In this mechanism, the probability estimate is 502 to the range [0,1] and can be thought of as a history weight: the larger its value, the more weight 506 is given to observations further back in time. If α = 0, then pobserved is equal to the last 507 observation; if α = 1, then pobserved equals a plain average of all observations; if 0 < α <1, then 508 pobserved is a weighted average of all observations, with higher weight given to more recent 509 observations. Just as in the Delta mechanism, we include a response threshold such that slider 510 updates are made only when the discrepancy between belief and current slider value is 511 sufficiently large. 512
Factor 2: Threshold mechanism. All three updating mechanisms described above involve 513 a threshold, denoted as T1: the IIAB mechanism has an "is it broke" threshold that prevents 514 hypothesis updating when there is too little evidence that something is wrong and the other two 515 updating mechanisms have a response threshold that prevents slider updating when it is not 516 worth the effort. In the original formulation of the IIAB model, the "is it broke" discrepancy is 517 measured as KL divergence, ε=KL(pobserved || pslider)×n, where pobserved is an estimate of pblue 518 based on the outcomes observed since the last change point, pslider is the currently held belief 519 and n is the number of trials since the last update. For the response threshold in the other two 520 mechanisms, however, a more obvious measure of discrepancy is the absolute difference, 521 ε=|pobserved − pslider|. This is indeed what Gallistel et al. (2014) used in their implementations of 522 delta-rule models. These two proposals differ from each other in two ways: the discrepancy is 523 either measured as KL divergence (ε=KL(Δ)) or as an absolute difference (ε=|Δ|) and it is either 524 multiplied by n (ε=KL(Δ)×n; ε=|Δ|)×n) or not. To dissociate the effects of threshold choice from 525 effects of updating mechanism on goodness of fit, we cross these options factorially, which 526
gives rise to four different threshold mechanisms. Combining each updating mechanism with 527 each threshold mechanism results in a total of 12 models (see Table 3 ). 528
Threshold variability. Since cognitive processes are generally noisy, it seems plausible 529 that threshold T1 varies from trial to trial. Therefore, following the proposal by Gallistel et al. 530 (2014), we draw the value of T1 on each trial from a normal distribution with a mean μT1 and 531 standard deviation σT1, both of which are fitted as free parameters. 532 533 
Model fitting methods 541
Due to the existence of latent variables in the IIAB models and the presence of trial 542 dependencies, the proper likelihood function is intractable for some of the models. Therefore, 543 we use a simplified, "custom" likelihood function for model fitting (Appendix B). We use the 544 Bayesian Adaptive Direct Search (BADS) method (Acerbi & Ma, 2017) to find the parameters 545 that maximise this function. In order to reduce the risk of terminating in local maxima, we run 546 BADS thirty times with different initial parameter values. Prior to each run, we evaluate the 547 likelihood function for five hundred randomly drawn parameter vectors and choose the vector 548 that gives the highest outcome as the initial parameter vector for BADS. Results from a model 549 recovery analysis confirm that these methods allow for reliable model comparison (see 550
Appendix C). 551 552
Benchmark dataset 553
To get the most out of the model comparison, we fit the models to both our own data and 554 the data from three previous studies, which were made available to us by the respective authors 555 Table 4 ). 6 The number of 556 trials per participant varied from 2,000 to 10,000 across experiments, with a grand total of 557 21 408,000 trials. To the best of our knowledge, all experiments were conducted in sessions of 558 1,000 trials each, with breaks between consecutive sessions. Because of these breaks, we 559 suspect that parameter values might not be stable across sessions. Therefore, we fit the models 560 separately to each session, of which we have 408 in total (Table 4 ). All data are available online 561 as a benchmark data set at https://osf.io/zhv2r/. 562 563 
Model comparison 566
We fit the twelve models (Table 3) separately to each of the 408 datasets (Table 4 ) for a 567 total of 4,896 fits. In doing so, we include only the first 750 trials from each dataset, so that we 568 can use the remaining 250 trials for cross validation. 569
Model comparison based on AIC values shows a large heterogeneity between participants 570 ( Figure 3A, left) : there is not a single model that provides a good fit to all datasets and every 571 model seems to perform well on at least one dataset. Despite this heterogeneity, it is clear that 572 some models perform better overall than others. In particular, the IIAB models generally fit 573 worse than the Delta and M-Avg models. When averaging the relative AIC values across 574 datasets ( Figure 3A, right) , the most successful model is the one with a memory-based updating 575 mechanism and a threshold mechanism based on the absolute difference (M-Avg with ε=|Δ|). 576
All other models have an average AIC value of at least 50 points larger, which would even 577 under a very conservative criterion be reason to reject them all. However, given the 578 heterogeneity at the individual level, it seems unwarranted to rule out individual models at this 579 stage. 580 Instead of looking at individual models, it may be more informative to look at the success 582 of each factor level. To this end, we compute the log factor likelihood as proposed by Shen and 583 Ma (2019) to quantify the evidence for each factor level ( Figure 4 ). Consistently across 584 experiments, the results reveal strong evidence against the IIAB updating mechanism, while 585 the two trial-by-trial mechanisms perform approximately equally well in most experiments. In 586 terms of threshold mechanisms, we observe that there is evidence against models that 587 incorporate the number of trials since the last slider update, while there is approximately equal 588 evidence for mechanisms based on the absolute difference and mechanisms based on KL 589 divergence. 590
While AIC is widely used as a measure of fit, it is not necessarily a good measure of 591 prediction due to possible overfit. Therefore, we next compare models based on the log 592 likelihood of the last 250 trials of each session, which were not included during model fitting. 593
The results of this cross-validation analysis (Appendix D) show a pattern that is largely similar 594 to the AIC-based results: there is large heterogeneity at the level of individual datasets, models 595 with an IIAB updating mechanism generally perform poorly, and there is no strong evidence in 596 favour or against specific threshold mechanisms. However, the evidence is now more even 597 between the Delta and M-Avg mechanisms and it is harder to distinguish between the threshold 598 mechanisms. 599 
Parameter estimates 612
An overview of the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for each model is found in 613 Appendix E. The estimate of σunexplained is on average smaller in the M-Avg and Delta models 614 than in the IIAB models, suggesting that the latter kind of model leaves more variance 615 unexplained than the former two, which is consistent with the model comparison results. In the 616 best-fitting model (M-Avg with ε=|Δ|), the median value of this parameter is 5.64×10 −2 . This is 617 rather small in relation to the response scale (0 to 1), which corroborates our earlier conclusion 618 that the model provides a reasonably good account of the data. For parameters μT1 and σT1 we 619 find median values equal to 0.470 and 0.207, respectively. These values indicate a relatively 620 high response threshold with quite a high degree of trial-by-trial variability. We speculate that 621 the variance captured by these parameters also includes other sources of variability in response 622 behaviour (e.g., noise in the calculation of ε and variability in the applied learning rate or 623 memory weight) which are not specified in the models. 624
Finally, we estimate how much outcome history the winning M-Avg takes into account 625 in its trial-by-trial estimates of ptrue. The memory weight in this model drops exponentially with 626 history length, with a rate that is determined by parameter α. We quantify the history length as 627 the number of trials that cover 95% of the total weight mass. Based on the maximum-likelihood 628 estimates of α, we find a median length of 33 trials (25% quantile: 19 trials; 75% quantile: 97 629 trials). 630 25 632 633
Model comparison with fixed thresholds 634
All models that we have tested so far had a variable threshold. We next address two 635 questions regarding this variability. First, how much do the fits suffer if the variable threshold 636 is replaced by a fixed one? Second, do the conclusions that we draw from the model comparison 637 depend on the existence of threshold variability? To answer these questions, we re-fit the twelve 638 models with σT1 fixed to 0. While the AIC value worsens for each of the twelve modelsby a 639 minimum of 728±38 pointsthe model order is near-identical to the order we found with the 640 models with variable thresholds ( Figure 6A ). Hence, while the assumption of variability in 641 p 250 500 750 1000
Trial number 1 250 500 750 1000 0 0.5 1 E7, S1 E8, S1
True p Participant Model A 0 0.5 1 E5, S1 E6, S1 0 0.5 1 E3, S1 E4, S1 0 0.5 1 E1, S1 E2, S1 The IIAB models have a threshold at the belief updating stage, while the trial-by-trial 648 updating models have a threshold at the response stage. This creates a potential interpretation 649 problem regarding the model comparison results: is the relatively poor performance of the IIAB 650 models due to its belief updating mechanism or due to it lacking a threshold at the response 651 stage? Or, put differently: can the IIAB model be salvaged by adding a response threshold? To 652 answer this question, we add a response threshold to the IIAB models and fit them again to all 653 408 datasets. We find that this modification improves the average AIC values of the IIAB 654 models by 200±6 points. However, despite this substantial improvement, the models still 655 perform poorly compared to the trial-by-trial models ( Figure 6B ). 656 
Two-kernel delta-rule model 657
Under conditions where there are large and infrequent changes, as in much of the 658 experimental data considered in this study, the standard versions of the delta-rule and memory-659 averaging models face a problem. If a lot of weight is put on the most recent history (by having 660 a high learning rate in the delta model or a low memory weight in the memory-averaging 661 model), the model will quickly catch on to changes but exhibit excessive volatility during the 662 long periods where the true probability is unchanged. If, on the other hand, it is only given a 663 little weight, excessive volatility will be avoided but the model will be slow to catch on to 664 sudden changes. As a potential solution, Gallistel et al. (2014) considered a two-kernel variant 665 that keeps track of two running averages. One kernel has a fast learning rate and the other a 666 slow one. When there is a sudden change, the discrepancy between the two estimates is large, 667 which is used as a signal that there has been a change and that the fast kernel should be trusted. 668
After some observations, the slow kernel will catch up and the discrepancy will decrease, 669 signalling that the fast kernel is no longer relevant. The model will then revert to reporting the 670 slow kernel's estimate. A similar extension is conceivable for the memory-averaging model, 671 by using two memory weights, but we limit our present analysis to the Delta model. 672
We next test whether a two-kernel delta-rule model is a serious contender to the other 673 models we have considered so far. The model keeps two estimates of the Bernoulli probability, 674 pslow,t = (1−λslow)pslow,t−1 + λslowOt and pfast,t = (1−λfast)pfast,t−1 + λfastOt. On trials where the absolute 675 difference between the two estimates is larger than a threshold Δc, the model takes pfast as its 676 estimate of the Bernoulli probability; otherwise it uses pslow as its estimate. The model thus has 677 two additional parameters compared to the standard delta-rule model tested above. As in the 678 main analysis, we combine this updating mechanism with all four thresholding mechanisms 679 (Table 3 ). We find that across all 1,632 fits, the additional kernel improves the AIC value of 680 the delta-rule models on average by 133±5 points. In terms of model comparison, the two-681 kernel delta-rule model with ε=KL(Δ) outperforms all other tested models ( Figure 6C ). 682 683
Fits to full datasets 684
In the analyses presented above, we have been fitting models to sessions of 1,000 trials 685 each to allow for the possibility that parameters can vary between sessions. To verify that our 686 conclusions do not critically depend on this choice, we next fit the models to the full datasets, 687 that is, with only one set of parameters per participant. Although there are small differences in 688 the model order ( Figure 6D) , the overall findings are the same as before: the M-Avg model with 689 ε=|Δ| comes out as the overall best model and the four IIAB models perform poorly. Hence, the 690 28 general conclusions of our model comparison do not seem to critically depend on whether we 691 fit the models to single sessions or to full datasets. 692 693
Fits to summary statistics 694
So far, we have been comparing models based on log likelihoods computed from fitting 695 raw data. One might argue, however, that it is also important that a model captures key summary 696 statistics derived from the raw data. In the context of probability estimation, Gallistel et al., 697 (2014) argued that two important summary statistics are the step widths and step heights. While 698 we agree with this, we are not convinced by their conclusion that it is impossible for any trial-699
by-trial updating model to account for the empirical joint distributions of these statistics. The 700 problem is that this conclusion was based on visual inspection of model behaviour for a 701 supposedly small number of manually picked parameter settings, rather than on a systematic 702 exploration of the parameter space. 703
To investigate more formally how well the models are able to account for the empirical 704 joint distributions of step widths and step heights, we use an optimisation algorithm to find the 705 parameters that minimise the Jensen-Shannon divergence 8 (JSD) between the empirical and the 706 predicted distributions. Since repeated computation of joint distributions makes this 707 optimisation very time-consuming, we fit the models with only one threshold variant in the 708 second model factor. To make it unlikely that our choice biases the results in favour of the trial-709 by-trial models, we choose ε=|Δ|×n for all three models, which was the most successful variant 710 for the IIAB model in the main analysis ( Figure 3) . We fit these models to full datasets, because 711 joint distributions for session-based data often contain too few data points for reliable fitting. 712
The left panel of Figure 7A presents the empirical data that led Gallistel et al. (2014) to 713 conclude that there are serious discrepancies between the kind of patterns generated by 714 participants and those generated by trial-by-trial models. In contrast to their conclusion, 715 however, we find that the three models perform approximately equally well, both visually 716 ( Figure 7A A B E3, S1 E5, S1 E7, S1 E1, S1
Step height E4, S1 E6, S1 E8, S1 E2, S1
Step width Step height
Step width
At the level of individual experiments, the IIAB model has the worst JSD in seven of the 727 eight cases ( Figure 8B) ; the only exception is E3, where all models have approximately equal 728 JSD, probably because it consists of only three participants. Overall, these results are consistent 729 with our main analysis in the sense that the Delta and M-Avg mechanisms perform roughly 730 equally well and better than the IIAB mechanism. However, it has to be noted that the JSD 731 differences are very small in comparison to the AIC differences (Figure 3) . This is because a 732 summary statistic can never contain more information than the raw data from which it is 733 derived, which follows from a theorem known as the data processing inequality (Cover & 734 Thomas, 2005) . We quantified this difference in a previous study (albeit in a different context), 735
where we found that the summary statistics contained only 0.15% of the evidence present in 736 the raw data (van den Berg & Ma, 2014). In light of this, we prefer to give more weight to 737 likelihood-based comparisons than comparisons based on summary statistics. 738
In conclusion, even if one considers the joint distribution of step widths and step heights 739 as the sole criterion to evaluate models on, there seems to be no ground for ruling out trial-by-740 trial models. If anything, the trial-by-trial models explain the data better than the hypothesis-741 testing model. 742
743
Slider updating consistency 744
The three updating mechanisms considered in this study (IIAB, Delta, M-Avg) have in 745 common that belief updates are always consistent with the most recent observation: observing 746 However, we find that across all 89 participants in our dataset, on average only 75.8±1.8% of 748 the updates were consistent with the most recent observation (range: 68.9% to 80.3%). Hence, 749 about one in every four updates was made in the direction opposite to the most recent observed 750 outcome. Threshold variability may be one source of these inconsistencies. To see why this is 751 the case, suppose that a participant observes three blue rings followed by a red one. If the 752 updating threshold happened to be high in the first three trials and low in the last trial, it can 753 happen that a slider update is made only in the fourth trial. 754
In agreement with our intuitions, we find that updating behaviour in the fits (to full 755 datasets) is 100% for all M-Avg and Delta models without threshold variability. However, 756 somewhat to our surprise, for the IIAB model we find that a small proportion of the updates 757
(1.4±0.3% across all 89 participants) is inconsistent with the last observation. We suspect that 758 this may have to do with the ability of the model to have "second thoughts", that is, to take back 759 an earlier made update. In any case, models without threshold variation predict much higher 760 updating consistency than what is observed in the data. 761
For models with threshold variation, we find substantially lower consistency values in the 762 fits: 91.6±0.8% (IIAB with ε=|Δ|), 83.7±1.6% (Delta with ε=|Δ|), and 83.6±1.0% (M-Avg with 763 ε=|Δ|). These results show that threshold variance may be one explanation for participants' 764 updating consistency rates. However, since they are still somewhat overestimated by these 765 models, it is likely that there are other sources too. Participants could, for example, be inferring 766 local sequential dependencies in the data. This would lead to beliefs of the form "the next ring 767 will surely be red since I have just drawn three blue ones" as opposed to "there is a high chance 768 of drawing a blue ring given that I have just drawn several of them", and thus inconsistent 769 updating. 770 771 Discussion 772
The most important point to take away from the modelling analyses is thatcontrary to 773 previous claimswe find no compelling evidence against trial-by-trial updating in human 774 estimation of non-stationary probabilities. In fact, we find this class of models to be more 775 successful at explaining behaviour than the hypothesis-testing models, with very high 776 consistency: it holds across all eight available datasets; it holds for models with and without 777 threshold variability; it is independent of whether model comparison is based on AIC values or 778 on cross-validation; it is independent of whether model comparison is based on raw data or 779 32 summary statistics; it is independent of whether we fit the models to full data sets or per session; 780 and it still holds if we add a second variable threshold to the IIAB model. 781
It is difficult to say which of the two types of trial-by-trial models is the more successful 782 one. When applied to data from probability estimation tasks, M-Avg models have a slight 783 advantage over Delta models in AIC-based model comparison. However, the results are 784 reversed in model comparison based on cross validation and in the results from the binary 785 prediction task. Altogether, these results suggest to us that the two classes of models make very 786 similar predictions, but that M-Avg models may be more susceptible to overfitting. 787
Allowing the threshold to vary is important for any model to describe the participants' 788 behaviour well. This kind of variance could have multiple origins. Our finding that the two-kernel delta-rule model outperformed all other models on the 799 probability estimation task suggests that participants may have been keeping track of both slow 800 and fast changes in the probability that they were estimating. Another possible explanation is 801 that they were in fact behaving as described by a single-kernel model that updates its learning 802 rate as a function of the prediction errors, as suggested by Behrens et al. (2007) . Intuitively, this 803 mechanism should be able to solve the problem which a regular trial-by-trial model will face 804 when tracking a function with large but infrequent changes: that the estimate sometimes needs 805 to be highly sensitive to new observations and at other times less sensitive in order to track it 806 well. This is an interesting question for future work. 807
Lastly, we made an interesting observation which to the best of our knowledge has not 808 been reported before: a rather large proportion of the slider updates was inconsistent with the 809 most recent draw from the Bernoulli distribution. While threshold variability may be part of the 810 explanation, we suspect that there are other sources too. Since the origin of these inconsistencies 811 could be informative about the underlying belief updating mechanism, further investigation of 812 this issue could lead to important improvements of the theories. 813
GENERAL DISCUSSION 814
While there is an extensive literature on human estimation of stationary probabilities 815 (Edwards, 1961; Estes, 1976; Fiedler, 2000; Peterson & Beach, 1967) , research on estimation 816 of non-stationary probabilities has only just begun. An important observation made by the 817 studies that have been pioneering this area is that humans tend to report their probability updates 818 in a stepwise manner (Gallistel et al., 2014; Khaw et al., 2017; Ricci & Gallistel, 2017; 819 Robinson, 1964) . Ricci and Gallistel (2017) posited that explaining this kind of behaviour is 820 the number one challenge for any model based on trial-by-trial updating. In this article, we took 821 up this challenge and scrutinised the claim in two ways. First, we reported empirical data which 822 investigated the malleability of these observed stepwise behaviours, and which expanded the 823 empirical data base for distinguishing between the different models considerably. Second, we 824 evaluated the different models using more rigorous likelihood-based model comparisons, 825 applying them both to our new data and to the data sets from three previously published studies. 826
In the experiment, using two novel manipulations, we found evidence that particulars of 827 the experimental design affect the discreteness in the response patterns, in turn suggesting that 828 the stepwise behaviours need not exclusively or mainly be a signature of hypothesis testing. In 829 particular, the finding that the extent of stepwise behaviours is strongly affected by the effort 830 required to produce the response indicates that there are covert changes in beliefs that are not 831 disclosed when there are asymmetric costs of maintaining vs. changing the response. The rate 832 of stepwise behaviour was also affected by instructions about the non-stationarity of the 833 process, indicating that there are a priori adaptations of the process that are responsive to 834 instructions (e.g., changes in the priors across a hypothesis space or changes in the sampling 835 window effectively used for estimation). The characteristic patterns of rare and large changes 836 observed in the previous studies were not general, but mainly observed in one of the four 837 experimental cells. 838
Furthermore, using rigorous model comparison methods, we found that not only our own 839 data, but also all previous data sets are better accounted for by models based on trial-by-trial 840 updating than by models based on hypothesis testing. This conclusion held across eight data 841 sets and across a variety of different criteria for evaluating the fit of the models. However, we 842 should immediately point out that the ambition of this article is not to proclaim the death of 843 hypothesis testing models, but rather to suggest that the reports of the death of trial-by-trial 844 learning models have been greatly exaggerated. Ultimately, we would expect thatas is true 845 in most areas of cognitive sciencethe mind is able to draw on several different cognitive 846 processes for learning about a property as fundamental to adaptation as probability. 847
More challenges 848
While the modelling results presented above may appear conclusive, Ricci and Gallistel 849 (2017) raised several additional challenges for trial-by-trial models in excess of the question of 850 how to explain stepwise updating. Here, we briefly address these. The first one is to explain 851 that "participants perceive the changes themselves" when there are abrupt and large changes. 852
The authors considered the possibility of a trial-by-trial model with both a slow and fast kernel, 853 the latter of which should be able to detect abrupt changes. However, they rejected that model 854 because they were unable to find parameter settings that produced summary statistics matching 855 the patterns in participant data. Here, we performed a rigorous model comparison and found 856 that the two-kernel delta-rule model actually beats all other models that we tested. Based on 857 this finding, we believe that it would be interesting for future work to examine to what extent 858 perceptions of abrupt changes in a two-kernel Delta-rule model coincide with those perceived 859 by participants. 860
Another challenge posited by Ricci and Gallistel (2017) is to explain that participants 861 sometimes have "second thoughts about previously perceived changes in the hidden 862 parameter". An elegant property of the IIAB model is that the prediction of second thoughts is 863 integral to its updating mechanism. However, we believe that it would be wrong to reject trial-864 by-trial model based on the fact that they need additional assumptions to account for second 865 thoughts, because they might very well be governed by a separate process. A circumstance (in 866 this case a button) which explicitly invites people to re-evaluate their previous beliefs might 867 induce them to do so, but that is not to say that such behaviour must be integral to the iterated 868 online estimation which the present paradigm investigates. 869 A final challenge posited by Ricci and Gallistel (2017) is to explain that participants are 870 able to extract abstract information about the function that guides the true value of the 871 probability that they are tracking. In line with their findings, we observed in the post-experiment 872 questionnaires that many participants produced something that resembled a sinusoidal function 873 when asked to draw the function they believed they had been tracking. An appealing feature of 874 the IIAB is that the higher-order structure of the generative function may be derived from its 875 record of change points. However, the same is true for the M-Avg models, which keep a history 876 of previous outcomes. As was the case with the issue of second thoughts, we argue that 877 inference of the underlying function may be governed by a mechanism that is separate from the 878 updating mechanism. We agree with Ricci and Gallistel (2017) that such a mechanism should 879 rely on some sort of sequence memory, but that does not imply that the updating must too. To 880 shed more light on this, more data are required about the relation between sequences of 881 35 observed outcomes and the kind of abstract structures that participants infer from these 882 sequences. 883 884 Heterogeneity in updating strategies 885
Our model comparison results were unambiguous when considered at the group level: the 886 M-Avg mechanism accounted best for the data, followed by first the Delta mechanism and then 887 the IIAB mechanism (Figures 3 and 4) . However, at the level of individual participants, we 888 observed substantial heterogeneity in the results ( Figure 3A) . There are two possible 889 explanations for this. First, there may be true heterogeneity in the underlying cognition, in 890 which case it would be misleading to consider only group-level results. Second, the 891 heterogeneity could be an artefact caused by limitations of the analysis, such as the finite size 892 of the dataset, the use of a custom likelihood function, and the lack of guarantee that the 893 optimisation algorithm always converged to the maximum of this function. Indeed, the model 894 recovery analysis (Appendix C) showed some misclassifications even when the true model was 895 in the set of fitted models, although never between updating mechanisms. We can, at present, 896 neither rule out nor confirm that different individuals used different updating strategies. 897 898
Limitations 899
A first limitation of the present study is that we did not test hybrid models. Since the main 900 goal was to scrutinise previous conclusions drawn about the viability of trial-by-trial models, 901
we considered the testing of hybrid models outside the scope of the present work. However, 902 since hypothesis-testing and trail-by-trial updating are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the 903 most promising models might be ones that combine the two processes. 904
We also mentioned above that there remain unexplained differences between the observed 905 consistency rates and those predicted by the models. Intuitively, one possible cause is that 906 participants infer sequential dependencies within random processes (Ayton & Fischer, 2004) . 907 A participant who is under the impression that, say, three blues in a row indicate that the next 908 ring is most likely going to be red should update inconsistently after observing that sequence. 909
This has not been addressed in our experimentation or modelling, but experimental data exists 910 from a paradigm similar to our own. Toda (1958) rigged the Bernoulli sequence in his 911 probability estimation task in such a way that there were sequential patterns in the outcomes, 912 allowing him to study if these were inferred through observing the participants' subjective 913 probabilities. He inferred from the data that participants estimate probabilities in a way that is 914 approximately the Bayesian solution of a higher order Markov processa non-trivial trial-by-915 36 trial model. We are, however, reluctant to accept this conclusion. The problem is that the 916 probability estimates in Toda's task were derived indirectly from decisions in an ultimatum 917 bargaining game and thus likely to have been affected by first-mover advantage and people's 918 fairness concerns (Güth, 1995; Güth & Van Damme, 1998; Slembeck, 1999; Thaler & Camerer, 919 1995) . This may have biased his estimates. Future studies could adapt the present task with 920 Toda's (1958) rigged sequences to see if this increases the inconsistency rates beyond those in 921 a non-rigged control condition. 922
Another limitation is that we performed model comparisons based on a custom likelihood 923 function, because the proper likelihood function was intractable. Even though model recovery 924 analysis confirmed that the chosen function allowed for reliable model comparison, better 925 choices might have been possible and could have led to more conclusive results in terms of 926 distinguishing the four threshold mechanisms in the second model factor. We constructed the 927 custom likelihood function mainly based on "educated guesses" of what aspects are important 928 to consider. An alternative and probably better way would have been to derive a likelihood 929 function by starting with the proper one and then make simplifications until it becomes 930 tractable. 931
Lastly, during our debriefings, some participants reported that they counted or chunked 932 the observations. This could possibly imply a trivial dual-strategy hypothesis: some people 933 attempt to solve the task by counting, a strategy which is highly inefficient in the chaotic world 934 outside of the laboratory. When they update intuitively, they use a different system which does 935 not require working memory retention of observations. Manipulating working memory capacity 936 may confirm or reject this hypothesis and inform future studies which want to use similar tasks 937 since most scientists presumably will be more interested in the second, intuitive system we 938 must know if we need to control for counting. 939 940
Relation to behavioural economics 941
In their seminal work "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", originally published 942 in 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007) begin by recognising the fact that a "universal 943 system" of economic theory is not achievable in the foreseeable future, largely due to the lack 944 of a sufficient body of empirical observations. In anticipation of that, they make-do with "some 945 commonplace experience of human behavior" to demonstrate the mathematical framework we 946 today recognise as game theory. These behavioural assumptions have been criticised by 947 behavioural economists and cognitive psychologists (e.g. Mullainathan & Thaler, 2015; 948 Schoemaker, 1982; Tversky, 1975 
Concluding remarks 955
To the best of our knowledge, the first study that investigated human estimation of non-956 stationary probabilities directly was performed in 1964 (Robinson, 1964) . After that, it took 957 another 50 years before a serious modelling attempt was initiated to obtain an understanding of 958 the mechanism behind this important cognitive function (Gallistel et al., 2014) . That attempt 959 culminated in a rejection of the entire class of trial-by-trial models and the proposal that humans 960 instead use hypothesis testing to track non-stationary probabilities. Here, we scrutinised that 961 proposal and found that there is actually much stronger evidence for trial-by-trial updating than 962 for hypothesis testing. Hence, the rejection of trial-by-trial models seems to have been 963 premature. However, considering the juvenility of this field of research, we believe that it would 964 be equally wrong to use these results to rule out hypothesis-testing models. In the end, it may 965 turn out that humans use a mix of strategies. Therefore, future studies might benefit from 966 starting to look into hybrid models instead of continuing to restrict themselves to one particular 967 class. In doing so, they should strive to bring all the findingsfrom function learning through 968 binary choice to probability inferenceunder one umbrella. That way, applied researchers such 969 as economists may find important uses for the work. where p(Rsubject,t | RM,t) is as specified in Eq. (5). 1194
APPENDIX D -Cross validation results 1213 1214
In our main analysis, we fitted the models to only the first 750 trials in each dataset. Model 1215 comparison based on the log likelihood of the remaining trials ( Figure D) best-fitting model for individual datasets. Right: Relative log likelihood values averaged across datasets. One may notice that the cross-validated log likelihood differences are smaller than the AIC differences presented in Figure 4 . There are two reasons for this. First, AIC is defined as (roughly) twice the log likelihood and, second, the AIC values were based on three times the number of trials (750 vs 250). Hence, to make the cross-validated log likelihoods comparable to the AIC-based results, one should multiply them by a factor of 6. (B) Factor level comparison based on cross-validated log likelihoods. Top: Evidence for each level in the first factor, combined across all models. Bottom: Evidence for each level in the second factor, combined across all models. The most successful levels in each experiment are indicated by asterisks. 
